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INTRODUCTION

In 1993, at 25 years old, Dawn Stephenson pled guilty to bank
fraud.1 Ms. Stephenson took steps to turn her life around: she went to
community college, received an associate’s degree in human
services/mental health, and worked as a trauma coordinator at a
medical center.2 In 2010, Ms. Stephenson petitioned to have her
criminal record expunged because she wanted to pursue a career in
nursing and thought her criminal record would adversely impact her
ability to get a nursing license.3 She had not had a run-in with law
enforcement since her original conviction.4 To get more information
about her potential for licensure, she called the New York State
Division of Licensing Services, where a representative told her that

1.
2.
3.
4.

Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Id.
Id.
Id.
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“generally, if you have a record, you can’t be licensed.”5 Because of
this, Ms. Stephenson decided not to continue her education in
nursing.6
***
Marc La Cloche grew up in New York City and a couple of years
into his young adulthood, he was convicted of robbery in the first
degree.7 He served about 11 years in prison.8 While incarcerated,
Mr. La Cloche underwent barber training and found his passion:
cutting hair.9 Before his release in August 2000, he applied to a
licensing board for a barber apprentice certification.10 The board
denied the application because of his “lack of good moral character”
due to his criminal history, despite securing training for that specific
vocation through a prison training program.11 Mr. La Cloche
appealed, and in June 2001, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found
in Mr. La Cloche’s favor because a barber’s apprentice certificate
does not require evidence of “good moral character”; the ALJ
ordered the licensing agency to issue Mr. La Cloche a certificate.12
However, Mr. La Cloche was only able to work as a barber for a
few months,13 as the licensing agency appealed the ALJ’s decision as a
matter of law, reasoning that applicants are required, if requested, to
present satisfactory evidence of “good moral character.”14 In a
December 2001 decision, the Secretary of State reversed the ALJ’s
decision, revoked Mr. La Cloche’s license, and remanded the record

5. Id.
6. She was before the court because she wanted to expunge her record and
pursue a career in her preferred field, nursing. Id. at 570. The court denied her
request for expungement because her case was not an extreme circumstance. Id. at
571. The balancing test for expungement was between the government’s need to
maintain arrest records and the harm the records can cause citizens; Ms. Stephenson’s
case was not so extreme as to warrant an expungement. Id. at 567. Judge Raymond
Dearie noted that while he would not expunge her record, he believed that she would
be able to secure a nursing license because of her strong character and lack of
recidivism. See id. at 571.
7. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Banned from the Barbershop, VILL. VOICE (Nov. 1,
2005),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2005/11/01/banned-from-the-barbershop/
[https://perma.cc/LHA7-SS2G].
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See La Cloche v. Daniels, 755 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See La Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9379, at
*3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2006) (finding Mr. La Cloche worked for five months
with his license).
14. La Cloche, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
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to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings.15 Despite the
remand from the Secretary of State, the administrative hearings office
appeared to not hold a new hearing.16
After this decision, Mr. La Cloche commenced a proceeding to
annul the Secretary of State’s decision, arguing that “good moral
character is not required for an apprentice’s certificate.”17 The New
York Supreme Court found that “good moral character” is an implicit
requirement for the certificate, but that the state should not have
considered his criminal conviction the sole reason for having
inadequate moral character.18 The court then remanded for a
rehearing.19
At the rehearing in 2003, Mr. La Cloche submitted overwhelming
evidence of good character through glowing references from his
employers and landlord. He also submitted materials from his parole
officer.20 Despite Mr. La Cloche’s efforts, Administrative Law Judge
Roger Schneier found that Mr. La Cloche “failed to establish good
moral character.”21 Judge Schneier stated that Mr. La Cloche had not
given consistent testimony about one aspect of the robbery, so he had
not shown sufficient remorse.22 Mr. La Cloche did not recover his
license.23
Continuing to persevere after four years of bureaucratic red tape
surrounding a license that he was trained for while in prison, Mr. La
Cloche appealed Judge Schneier’s decision.24 Sadly, before the court
commenced proceedings for the appeal, Mr. La Cloche passed away.25
***
Ms. Stephenson’s and Mr. La Cloche’s situations show some of the
overshadowed impacts a criminal record can have on people’s lives.
Mr. La Cloche had unusual tenacity in navigating through the legal
system to advocate for a license reflecting the skills he gained while
incarcerated, and yet he was denied a license because of his criminal

15. Id.
16. See id.
17. La Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9379, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2006).
18. Id. at *4–5.
19. Id. at *5.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *5–6.
22. Id. at *6.
23. See id. at *7.
24. See id. at *6.
25. See id. at *6–7.
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record. For Ms. Stephenson, the court believed she would ultimately
be able to secure a nursing license, but because of licensing agents
who told her that her record would be a barrier, she did not pursue
the higher-paying job she originally strove for.26 The hurdles these
stories exemplify are not uncommon for people with criminal records
who try to secure licenses, but the stories show an uncommon
persistence. There are far greater numbers of people who do not
have the resources to advocate for a license in their career of choice.
***
The criminal legal system in the United States disproportionately
punishes Black and Latinx communities.27
A person’s initial
interaction with the criminal legal system can lead to widespread
consequences not only on the criminal charge but also on other areas
of life, including employment and licensure. Occupational licenses, a
government-provided credential that allows people to work in their
chosen profession, can increase a person’s pay,28 which is of
significant importance for people with criminal records, who, on
average, have incomes that are substantially below the poverty line.29

26. See Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
27. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2012-1,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
(2012)
[hereinafter
EEOC
GUIDANCE],
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-consideration-arrest-andconviction-records-employment-decisions [https://perma.cc/CAM5-JKHT].
28. See Jason Furman & Laura Giuliano, New Data Show That Roughly OneQuarter of U.S. Workers Hold an Occupational License, ARCHIVED OBAMA ADMIN.
WHITE HOUSE WEBSITE: THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 17, 2016, 10:30 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/06/17/new-data-show-roughly-onequarter-us-workers-hold-occupational-license [https://perma.cc/GQ3Y-76GH]; see
also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS &
DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 4
(2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_n
onembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFD3-YSLB] (finding that unlicensed workers earn
10 to 15% lower wages than similarly situated licensed workers). Further, in a study
considering three occupations — childcare workers, opticians, and veterinary
technicians — licensing increases average state-level wages. See Mark Gius, The
Effects of Occupational Licensing on Wages: A State-Level Analysis, 13 INT’L J.
APPLIED ECON. 30, 33 (2016).
29. See TERRY-ANN CRAIGIE, AMES GRAWERT & CAMERON KIMBLE,
CONVICTION, IMPRISONMENT, AND LOST EARNINGS: HOW INVOLVEMENT WITH THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
DEEPENS
INEQUALITY
18
(2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/202009/EconomicImpactReport_pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8KN-N3RT].
Formerly
imprisoned people earn around $6,700 annually, whereas similarly situated peers who
were not incarcerated earn around $13,800. Id. at 14.
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In recent years, advocates have successfully lobbied to change
policies around job application exclusions for people with criminal
records.30 Some jurisdictions, like New York City, have implemented
“ban the box” legislation to prevent discrimination against people
who have criminal records.31 However, such legislation does not
address the related issue of occupational licensing.
Anti-discrimination law as it currently exists is not well crafted to
reach the indirect effects of the criminal legal system. Without a
mechanism to address occupational licensing barriers for those with
criminal histories or those with arrests, the full inclusion of people of
color (specifically Black and Latinx folks) into the labor market as
well as the societal pursuit of racial equity will be impaired. For that
reason, this Note recommends adopting an amended version of New
York City’s Fair Chance Act (FCA) with modifications, including
specific coverage of occupational licensing agencies within the antidiscrimination framework, increased data collection, limitations on
requested information in background checks, and the creation of an
arm within the licensing agencies that can provide predetermination
admission or rejection recommendations. In this way, a modified and
strengthened FCA could help address the racial equity harms that
current anti-discrimination law doctrine cannot readily address.
To develop this argument, Part I provides background on
occupational licensure and the impacts it has on people with criminal
records or those with pending charges. Part II goes into further detail
about national and local anti-discrimination laws and the limits and
potential of those legal avenues. Part III then proposes amendments
to the FCA to strengthen anti-discrimination laws for those with
criminal records as it relates to licensure.

30. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 151B, § 4(9) (West 2018).
31. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Fair Chance Act, ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102, 8-107 (effective
Oct. 27, 2015); see also Opportunity to Compete Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11 to
34:6B-19 (West 2021); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON THE FAIR CHANCE ACT AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
(2021) [hereinafter LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE], https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
cchr/downloads/pdf/fca-guidance-july-15-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB9A-LJGH].
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I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND PROBLEMS FOR
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL HISTORIES

This Part outlines occupational licensure, the increase in licensure
in the past 70 years, specific issues that people with criminal records
face when securing licenses, and concerns specific to New Yorkers.
A. Occupational Licensure

i. What is Occupational Licensure?
A license is a grant of permission required by the government that
allows a licensee to perform, among other things, certain job-related
activities.32 There are two main types of licenses: revenue-raising and
regulatory.33 A revenue-raising license’s purpose is to raise revenue
for the state.34 A state, or municipality, uses its power to tax to
charge a business or profession a fee in exchange for the license.35 An
applicant pays a fee and receives a license; there is usually no
background check or inquiry into the competence of the applicant.36
In contrast, regulatory licenses, also known as occupational licenses,
are designed to protect the public interest by regulating occupations
that involve the public’s health, safety, and welfare.37 Using its police
powers, the state can require a license to participate in an occupation,
business, vocation, trade, or calling.38 Professions that state or local
government agencies require workers to be licensed in New York

32. See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing
Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D.
L. REV. 187, 189 (1995); see also CHIDI UMEZ & REBECCA PIRIUS, BARRIERS TO
WORK: IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT IN LICENSED OCCUPATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
CRIMINAL
RECORDS
1,
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Labor/Licensing/criminalRecords_v06_we
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2V5-XAAX] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
33. See May, supra note 32, at 189.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Department of Labor: Occupations Licensed or Certified by New York
State, N.Y. ST., https://statistics.labor.ny.gov/lstrain.shtm [https://perma.cc/ECU85H5H] (last visited Oct. 3, 2021); see also Annie Zhang, Note, Sanctioned

Unemployment: The Impact of Occupational Licensing Restrictions on ExOffenders, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 251 (2018). Doctors, lawyers, and dentists are
some of the professions that require occupational licensure. See Department of
Labor: Occupations Licensed or Certified by New York State, supra.
38. See May, supra note 32, at 190 (citing Republic Ent., Inc. v. Clark Cnty.
Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd., 672 P.2d 634, 637 (Nev. 1983)).
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include barbers, lawyers, school bus drivers, architects, funeral service
directors, plumbers, private detectives, and security guards.39
Licenses are mandatory.40 They set standards for a field, including
safety and quality for the workers who join that profession.41 They
are also time-limited, and “[v]iolation of the terms of the license can
result in legal action.”42 If a worker does not hold the proper license,
noncompliance penalties include fines, financial consequences,
administrative or criminal offenses, or an unenforceable contract
between the worker and the other party.43 Notably, a license does not
guarantee a job, rather it gives a worker permission to hold a job in a
specified field.44
There are two general components to occupational licensing
statutes: competency and character.45 The competency component
usually encompasses state or municipality-specific educational,
training, testing, and other requirements to practice in their chosen
field.46 For example, taxi drivers in New York City, which are
regulated by the Taxi and Limousine Commission, are required to get
a background check, have a safe driving record, and complete several
types of training, which includes driver training, a defensive driving
course, and wheelchair assistance training.47
In contrast, character components tend to be vague and predicated
on an applicant having “good moral character.”48 This poses the
greatest challenge for people with criminal records, as there is no
standard definition for what the character component entails, and
many jurisdictions use it as a means to exclude people with
convictions.49

39. See Zach Herman, The National Occupational Licensing Database, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/occupational-licensing-statute-database.aspx [https://perma.cc/DL4R3EH6].
40. See UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 32, at 1.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See Zhang, supra note 37, at 256.
44. See May, supra note 32, at 189.
45. See id.
46. See UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 32, at 1.
47. See
About
TLC,
N.Y.C.
TAXI
&
LIMOUSINE
COMM’N,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/about-tlc.page
[https://perma.cc/G4L9-XJTR]
(last visited Sept. 22, 2021); see also Get a TLC Drivers License, N.Y.C. TAXI &
LIMOUSINE
COMM’N,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/drivers/get-a-tlc-driverslicense.page [https://perma.cc/3WE4-H9A3] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
48. See infra Section I.B.i.
49. See infra Section I.B.i.
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ii. Marked Increase in Licensure Since the 1950s
Since the 1950s, there has been a marked increase in occupational
licensure in the United States.50 As of 2018, approximately 21.8% of
employed people have a license, as compared to 5% in 1950.51 The
increase stems from two related but separate trends. First, sectors that
require licensure have seen major growth.52 Service sector employees
are more likely to be licensed, at 32%, than in the manufacturing or
goods-producing sector, at 16%, and the service sector has grown in
the past 70 years.53 This accounts for one-third of the growth in
licenses. Second, there is an increase in the number of licensed
professions.54 Examples of sectors that were not historically licensed,
but now comprise occupations with the most licensed workers, are
sales, management, and construction.55
There are no standardized federal occupational licensure
requirements, which leads to varying standards across the country.
For example, in California, a manicurist needs 3,239 hours of required
experience while New York requires zero.56
Further, some
occupations are licensed in some states but are not in others, which
impacts overall licensure rates across the country.57 In New York
State, 20.7% of the workforce is licensed, as compared to a low of
12.4% in South Carolina and a high of 33.3% in Iowa.58 When
controlling for differences in jobs and occupations across the country,
the distribution of licenses remained similar.59 This indicates that the

50. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y

ET AL.,

supra note 28, at

17.
51. See Evan Cunningham, Professional Certifications and Occupational
Licenses: Evidence from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS.
(June 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2019/article/professional-certificationsand-occupational-licenses.htm#_ednref1 [https://perma.cc/G8AS-GQZW]; see also
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y ET AL., supra note 28, at 17.
52. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y ET AL., supra note 28, at
17–22.
53. See id. at 19.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 21.
56. See Herman, supra note 39. New York has other requirements for a
manicurist’s license but has no mandate for required experience. See id.
57. See id. California requires licenses for electricians, pharmacy technicians, and
general contractors, but not home inspectors, massage therapists, and athletic
trainers. See id. In New York, home inspectors, massage therapists, and athletic
trainers are licensed, whereas electricians, pharmacy technicians, and general
contractors are not. See id.
58. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y ET AL., supra note 28, at
24.
59. See id. at 25.
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job composition within states is not the primary reason for state
licensing variances, rather it is how states license different
occupations.60 Relatedly, licensure variation across states can impact
workers’ opportunities to relocate across state lines.61
The increase in sectors with licenses is strategic.
Professionalization through licensing can help practitioners gain
legitimacy by theoretically improving quality and public safety while
limiting the number of people with those sought out skills, which
provides competition and financial benefit for the industry.62
Licensing also provides educational requirements for those that hold
the license.63 Thus, licensing can provide an income boost because
providers are able to charge more by nature of having a license.64
Additionally, professional associations lobby for the creation of a
license for a sector, and those associations are generally able to
greater exercise political influence when compared to consumer
groups.65 Legislators usually do not have to grapple with the prospect
of finding additional funding for the licensing boards, as licensing fees
are the primary funding mechanism for the boards, which are often
revenue neutral.66 This provides a greater incentive for legislators to
approve licensing initiatives.67
B. Specific Issues People with Criminal Records Face with
Regards to Occupational Licensure

People who have contact with the criminal legal system can suffer
civil penalties — which can include restrictions on public benefits,
government assisted housing, voting rights, and occupational

60. See id. at 23–25.
61. See Herman, supra note 39.
62. See generally James Bessen, Everything You Need to Know About
Occupational
Licensing,
VOX
(Nov.
18,
2014,
10:26
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/11/18/18089272/occupational-licensing
[https://perma.cc/6CZE-7MQY]. See also The Costs of Occupational Licensing, INST.
FOR JUST. (Nov. 2018), https://ij.org/report/at-what-cost/costs-of-occupationallicensing/#citation_12 [https://perma.cc/4GJP-6S7X].
63. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y ET AL., supra note 28, at
21–23.
64. See id. at 4 (explaining that consumers may pay 3–16% higher prices for
goods, but the price increase does not necessarily reflect the quality of the goods and
services).
65. See id. at 22.
66. See id. at 22–23.
67. See id. at 23.
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licensure.68 These denials and restrictions are not incorporated into a
person’s sentence, but rather are woven into societal and legal
structures to limit the rights of people with criminal records.69 While
workers generally have barriers to licensure — such as education or
training necessary to obtain licensure — there are also barriers
specific to people with criminal records, including “good moral
character” components, blanket bans, cost, and a general lack of
transparency.70 These issues can impact over 70 million people living
in the United States with criminal records.71

i. “Good Moral Character” Component and Blanket Bans for
People with Felonies
In Hawker v. New York, the Supreme Court established that the
state can define the qualifications of licenses through its police power,
that “good moral character” can be a prerequisite to licensure, and
that the content of the conviction can be proof of quality of
character.72 This laid the groundwork for the most challenging aspect
for people with records to secure licensure: the character
component.73 There is not a standard definition of “good moral
character” across states, and the Supreme Court has noted how the
term is “unusually ambiguous” and can be “a dangerous instrument

68. See Runa Rajagopal, Diary of a Civil Public Defender: Critical Lessons for
Achieving Transformative Change on Behalf of Communities, 46 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 876, 893 (2019); see also May, supra note 32, at 189.
69. See May, supra note 32, at 189.
70. See infra Section I.B.
71. See Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal
Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/just-facts-many-americanshave-criminal-records-college-diplomas
[https://perma.cc/Q3A8-VE4G].
For
reference, approximately the same number of people have four-year college degrees.

Id.
72. 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (upholding the denial of a physician’s license to a
man convicted of performing an abortion). The Court remarked:
[I]f the legislature enacts that one who has been convicted of crime shall no
longer engage in the practice of medicine, it is simply applying the doctrine
of res judicata, and invoking the conclusive adjudication of the fact that the
man has violated the criminal law, and is presumptively, therefore, a man of
such bad character as to render it unsafe to trust the lives and health of
citizens to his care.
Id. at 196. Further, the Court stated: “Felons are also excluded from obtaining such a
license, not as an additional punishment, but because the conviction of a felony is
evidence of the unfitness of such persons as a class . . . .” Id. at 197.
73. See May, supra note 32, at 195.
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for arbitrary and discriminatory denial” to occupational licensure.74
Because of the lack of guidance on what a “good moral character”
clause means, many licensing authorities interpret this clause as a ban
for those with a criminal record.75
The “good moral character” component acutely impacts those with
felony convictions. There are several different approaches states may
take: (i) a felony conviction is an automatic disqualification;76 (ii) it is
evidence of the lack of a “good moral character,”77 or (iii) it is
important to consider if the conviction relates to the job the applicant
seeks licensure for or if the conviction involves moral turpitude.78 In
approximately half of states, licenses can be denied for convictions of
any kind, regardless of whether the conviction relates to their job or
how long ago the offense occurred.79 These varied standards and the
lack of oversight from a central licensing agency may contribute to a
lack of predictability and consistency.80

74. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). In Konigsberg,
the issue related to a denial of a law license for suspicions of supporting the
Communist Party. See id. at 273. The California Supreme Court did not produce a
definition of “good moral character” for the Supreme Court to use, and counsel for
the State produced a definition that was not supported in prior case law — all of
which contribute to questions surrounding ambiguity. See id. at 263.
75. See Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character

Requirement in Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration
Proceedings, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1027, 1031–33 (2018); see also DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y ET AL., supra note 28, at 48–49.
76. For example, in Vermont, a license applicant may be rejected because of a
“conviction of a felony, whether or not related to the practice of the profession.” See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 129a(a)(10) (2021). However, these blanket bans are against
guidance promulgated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
77. For example, to become an accountant in Idaho, evidence of a lack of “good
moral character” includes felony convictions. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
24.30.01.020(02)(a) (2021).
78. For example, in Michigan, a licensing board may consider the conviction as
evidence of a lack of “good moral character” for felony convictions if the conviction
relates to the activities authorized by the occupational license. See H.B. 4488, 100th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Mich. 2021).
79. See Rhode, supra note 75, at 1033; see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: RESEARCH, STATE
POLICIES
AND
TRENDS
8
(2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/employ/Licensing/State_Occupational_Lic
ensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/78CG-RSZ4].
80. See generally UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 32, at 3.
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ii. Cost: Education, Training, and Application Fees
In addition to barriers sanctioned by the state, cost and educational
barriers also have a disproportionate impact on applicants who have a
criminal record. Costs associated with licensure — which include
training, education, and application fees81 — impact low-wage
workers the most, as they must pay a larger proportion of their wages
to licensing boards and training entities. People who have criminal
records tend to make significantly less and have less wealth than
similarly situated peers.82
In the hopes of securing gainful
employment, some people with criminal records may invest time and
scarce resources into fulfilling prerequisites for licensure, like further
education, and then find themselves denied because of their record.83

iii. Lack of Transparency Regarding Which Offenses Are
Obstacles to Licensure
There are significant transparency issues with the license
application itself. Some states have applications where it seems that
any criminal history might impact eligibility, as they do not distinguish

81. For example, securing a barbering license in New York requires an
apprenticeship, education, or experience. Education can cost $5,600 for a 500-hour
training course, in addition to $40 for an initial application, $40 to renew a license,
$15 for a practical exam, and costs associated with a health examination by a
physician. See 500 Hour Master Barber Program, AM. BARBER INST.,
https://www.abi.edu/courses/500-hours-barber-operator-program
[https://perma.cc/AM2G-KPTJ] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021); see also Barber, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T ST., https://dos.ny.gov/barber [https://perma.cc/VBS4-F8MB] (last visited Sept.
19, 2021). These costs do not include traditional cost of living expenses while a person
is in school to secure the education necessary for a license.
82. Formerly imprisoned people earn around $6,700 annually, whereas similarly
situated peers who were not incarcerated earn around $13,800. See CRAIGIE ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 14. People with a felony conviction not sentenced to imprisonment
have a 22% reduction in annual income (i.e., comparing $29,400 to $23,000, which
impacts 12.1 million people). Id. at 15. It is difficult to accurately determine data for
people with a felony conviction that were sentenced to imprisonment, as it is unclear
whether the decrease in annual income is due to (A) prolonged separation from the
job market; (B) the stigma of having a criminal conviction alone; or (C) a
combination of the two, and to what degree the factors weigh. Id. at 26. People with a
misdemeanor conviction have a 16% annual income reduction when compared to
peers (comparing $32,000 with $26,900 which impacts 46.8 million people). See id. at
15. Further, over the course of a lifetime, “[f]ormerly imprisoned Black and Latin[x]
people suffer greater lifetime earnings losses — $358,900 and $511,500, respectively
— than their white counterparts, whose losses amount to $267,000.” Id. at 19; see also
Ashley Nerbovig, License to Clip, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/10/license-to-clip
[https://perma.cc/AFW5-W6GE].
83. See UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 32, at 3.
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that only convictions relevant to the occupation at hand would be
adversely considered.84 This might have an unfavorable impact and
deter qualified people from applying.85 This was the hurdle that Ms.
Stephenson faced: Ms. Stephenson ultimately stopped her pursuit of a
nursing license because she thought the licensing board would view
her offense conviction negatively.86 Additionally, background check
disqualifications “tend to have a chilling effect on people with records
pursuing an occupation,”87 and there is no current data that show how
many people either apply and are rejected or are deterred because of
the chilling effect. While there is no official record of how many
people this chilling effect has deterred from pursuing their dreams,
the consequences are greatly limiting.
C. Concerns for New Yorkers

Some of these issues are mitigated in New York, as 86% of people
with a criminal record who applied in 2018 were granted licensure.88
This approval number is higher than many other states in part
because licensing agencies must analyze the conviction and if it
relates to the license that the applicant seeks.89 To deny an applicant
a license based on their criminal record, a licensing agency must show
that (i) there is a direct relationship between the criminal offense and
the specific license sought or (ii) the issuance of the license would
involve an unreasonable risk to property or the safety or welfare of
the general public.90

84. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT, UNLICENSED & UNTAPPED: REMOVING BARRIERS TO STATE
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES FOR PEOPLE WITH RECORDS 25, 37, 41 (2016),
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-RemovingBarriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/P64N-JEK7].
85. Id. at 25.
86. See Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
87. RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 84, at 25.
88. See INST. FOR JUST. & OPPORTUNITY & CITY UNIV. OF N.Y., GETTING TO
WORK WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD: NEW YORK STATE LICENSE GUIDES 1 (2020),
https://justiceandopportunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/LicenseGuides_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG7V-FPV7]. However, the state does not
provide further information on the 86% statistic, particularly as it relates to which
offenses are more often rejected, how many of those are misdemeanors versus
felonies, the acceptance numbers per agency, or if there are patterns within the
agencies as to which offenses are frequently denied.
89. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2021). See generally N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2021).
90. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2021).
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Many licensing agencies in New York require “good moral
character,” which creates issues for people with criminal records. To
combat employment discrimination against people with criminal
records, the state passed laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of criminal history with limited exceptions.91 However, as shown
initially with Mr. La Cloche, who applied for a barbering license when
these nexus laws were in effect, they do not preclude licensing
agencies from rejecting applicants that demonstrate good character.92
The bar for agencies to state how the criminal offense relates to the
job at hand or has potential to cause risk to the public is relatively
low. These initial agency determinations are rarely overturned by
ALJs or the courts because of deference to licensing agencies.93
Despite New York State’s nexus law, securing licensure is a
problem for people with criminal records because of the lack of
transparency. As illustrated with Ms. Stephenson in the Introduction,
potential applicants might receive misguided information from the
agencies as to how influential criminal records are to their
application, and the applicant would then be dissuaded, despite their
likelihood of approval, depending on the offense.94 There are no
estimates for how many people are deterred from seeking licensure,
but this issue warrants further study and exploration, including
potential Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests.95

91. Id.
92. See generally La Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
9379, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
93. An administrative agency is entitled to degrees of judicial deference,
particularly when an agency is charged with the administration of a statute, if the
Appeal Board’s interpretation is supported by a rational basis. See In re Claim of
Gruber, 674 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Rosen v. Public. Emp. Relations
Bd., 526 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y. 1988)).
94. See Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(stating Ms. Stephenson was told by a licensing agency that people with criminal
records are generally unable to secure a nursing license, which resulted in Ms.
Stephenson discontinuing her nursing education despite her strong character and lack
of recidivism).
95. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 84, at 25. A FOIL request is a formal
submission requesting information related to government records from New York
State. See Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) Request, N.Y. ST.,
https://www.governor.ny.gov/freedom-information-law-foil-requests
[https://perma.cc/7G4V-JJM8] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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i. License Suspensions Upon Arrest or Issuance of
Desk Appearance Tickets
Summary suspension is a suspension of a license after an allegation
— i.e., an arrest or issuance of a ticket96 — before there is a full
hearing on the matter. Rooted in administrative law, summary
suspensions are separate from criminal charges but nonetheless
prevent a person from working in their field while charges pend. For
example, if an Uber driver is arrested, the arrest information is
automatically sent to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services (DCJS).97 From there, DCJS provides that information to a
state licensing agency, the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC),
whose Chairperson can then suspend a license.98 Notably, prior to
2019, DCJS did not provide information related to the factual bases
or allegations from the arrest, only the arrest charge itself.99 The TLC
Chair’s determination derived from whether the charges, presuming
they were true, constituted a substantial threat to public health or
safety. However, after the Second Circuit’s decision in Nnebe v.
Daus, which challenged summary suspension procedures for taxi
drivers, the Taxi and Limousine Commission reworked their
frameworks so that they are not so narrowly construed.100
Mustafa Kamal’s heartbreaking predicament exemplified this issue.
Mr. Kamal was a licensed taxicab driver, and his license was
suspended after he was issued a desk appearance ticket for “leaving
the scene of a personal injury accident.”101 Because the standard of
review for Rule 8-16(c), which governed the summary suspension
96. A desk appearance ticket is a “written notice issued and subscribed by a
police officer . . . directing a designated person to appear in a designated local
criminal court at a designated future time in connection with his alleged commission
of a designated offense.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.10(1) (McKinney 2021).
97. See,
e.g.,
Criminal
Justice
Statistics,
N.Y.
ST.,
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm
[https://perma.cc/4YZV3594] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (explaining the role of DCJS). An example of one of
the agencies that follows this practice is the Taxi and Limousine Commission. See
Notice of Promulgation of Rules, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N 2 (2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/summary-suspension-rules-2020-1202.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBU7-MYNX].
98. See id. Licensing agencies in New York City have this authority through
Section 2303 of the New York City Charter and Section 19-503 of the New York City
Administrative Code. See N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER ch. 65, § 2303(b)(5) (2021); N.Y.C.,
N.Y., CODE tit. 19, § 19-503 (2021).
99. See Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Nnebe v. Daus,
931 F.3d 66, 83 (2d Cir. 2019).
100. See 510 F.Supp. 3d 179, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
101. See Taxi & Limousine Comm’n v. Kamal, OATH index No. 2607/10, at 1
(June 1, 2010).
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proceedings, was so narrow — only allowing the ALJ to consider the
charge itself — the ALJ upheld Mr. Kamal’s suspension, as they could
only take the ticket’s allegations at face value and presume the
charges were true.102 Mr. Kamal was suspended solely for issuance of
a ticket. As those who are issued tickets must wait months to be
formally charged, this process left Mr. Kamal without a livelihood for
an extended period of time.103 This situation is in contrast with a
person who is arrested and may have their charges dismissed
immediately at arraignments or face, at maximum, a couple of weeks
without a license.104
II. LIMITATIONS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW TO REMEDY
RESTRICTIONS FOR LICENSURE APPLICANTS OF COLOR
WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS

This Part explores the potential for applicants of color with a
criminal record to try to remedy licensing board discrimination
through litigation using anti-discrimination law. This Part further
compares the potential of using anti-discrimination laws to protect the
corollary effects of the criminal legal system on occupational
licensure: a federal anti-discrimination law, Title VII, a city antidiscrimination law, the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL), and the merits of a due process claim for summary
suspensions. First, the Author outlines the frameworks for Title VII
claims of disparate treatment and impact. Next, the Author discusses
the Second Circuit’s approach to a similar case for discrimination
based on criminal records but relating to job applications instead of
license applications. The Author then analyzes the limitations of
bringing a Title VII claim for occupational licenses. Last, the Author
outlines relevant New York City-specific statutes that might further
claims of discrimination, in addition to accounting for recent due
process claims as they relate to summary suspensions.
A. Title VII and an Anti-Discrimination Approach

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
enforces Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.105 Having a

102. Id. at 5. This decision was despite Mr. Kamal’s witnesses observing a man
attack Mr. Kamal’s car. See id. at 2–3.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 5.
105. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
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criminal record is not a protected status, meaning the EEOC only
considers whether or not an employer’s106 reliance on a criminal
record violates Title VII if there is an additional protected class that
comprises the claim.107 For example, if plaintiffs could show the
existence of a link between a criminal record and race, they might be
able to put forth a discrimination claim based on race. Title VII
liability for employment discrimination is determined using two
frameworks — either “disparate treatment”108 or “disparate
impact.”109
An example of a successful disparate impact case is Green v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, where Buck Green, who is Black, filed a
class action against Missouri Pacific Railroad (MoPac).110 Green
alleged the employer’s policy violated Title VII in disqualifying
applicants with a “conviction of any crime other than a minor traffic
offense,” which disqualified Black people at higher rates than whites
and was not job-related.111 The Eighth Circuit held that MoPac’s
policies violated Title VII.112 Green used statistics, specifically

106. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, but formerly
incarcerated people may allege that “record-based employer hiring policies are
analogous to record-based occupational licensing laws,” so the laws themselves
violate Title VII. See Zhang, supra note 37, at 264; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). As
explored later in this Note, the FCA makes more explicit that licensing agencies fall
under the anti-discrimination statute, so a claim brought using the New York City
Human Rights Law might be more successful. See infra Part III.
107. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
108. Id. Disparate treatment occurs when a plaintiff, or group of plaintiffs, can
show that an employer treats a plaintiff differently because of their race, national
origin, or another protected basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). If an employer
received identical job applications from a white person and a Black person with the
same criminal record, but the white applicants were referred for interviews and the
Black applicants were not, this would be an example of treating applicants differently
on the basis of race. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27. To satisfy a plaintiff’s
initial burden of proof, the plaintiff must show that (1) they belong to a protected
class; (2) they applied and were qualified for a job or license for which the employer
or agency was seeking applicants; (3) despite their qualifications, they were rejected;
and (4) after rejection, the position remained open and the employer or agency
continued to seek applicants. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). From there, the applicant must then show that the employer’s reason was
pretext for discrimination prohibited by Title VII. See id. at 804–05.
109. A class-based disparate impact discrimination claim, focused on effects and
not on intent, occurs when a plaintiff shows the employer’s seemingly neutral policy
or practice disproportionately impacts a Title VII-protected group and the employer
cannot demonstrate that the policy is related to the job and consistent with business
necessity. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
110. 523 F.2d 1290, 1292–93 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1298–99.
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MoPac’s records of employment applications and rejections, to
establish a disproportionate impact on Black applicants.113 The three
factors the court assessed when considering whether an exclusion is
job-related and consistent with business necessity are: (i) the nature
and gravity of the offense or conduct; (ii) how long ago the offense
occurred and if the sentence is completed; and (iii) the nature of the
job sought.114 While this outcome might seem promising for people
with criminal records who are barred from licensure, there are several
complicating factors which would make the use of federal antidiscrimination law untenable.

i. Current Trends in Employment Law Cases
Within the last two decades, most claims of employment
discrimination have been individual claims of intentional
discrimination instead of class claims of disparate impact.115 George
Rutherglen, a scholar and Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia, attributes this change to three primary trends: an increased
burden when bringing class claims, more demanding procedural
requirements for class claims, and increased doctrinal complexity.116
The Second Circuit’s recent holdings provide examples of these
issues.

1. Legal Landscape in the Second Circuit for Disparate Impact
Claims, Informed by EEOC Guidance and Mandala v. DTT
In 2012, the EEOC issued guidance on the consideration of arrest
and conviction records in employment decisions under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.117 The EEOC noted that Black and
Latinx people are disproportionately arrested at two to three times
the number of the general population.118 The data supported a
finding that criminal record exclusions for job applicants have a

113. Id. at 1294–96.
114. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27; see also Green, 523 F.2d at 1297–99.
115. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 74–75 (5th ed., 2020).
116. Id. at 75.
117. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
118. Id. The EEOC also noted the disproportionate rate of incarceration based on
race, where the “Department of Justice estimated in 2001 that 1 out of every 17
[w]hite men (5.9% of the [w]hite men in the U.S.) is expected to go to prison at some
point in his lifetime,” whereas the rate is “1 in 6 (or 17.2%)” for Latinx men, and “1
in 3 (or 32.2%)” for Black men. Id.
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disparate impact based on race and national origin.119 The EEOC
provided an example in which an employer had an exclusion policy
that automatically rejected applicants convicted of a crime —
otherwise known as a blanket ban discussed in Part I.120 The example
company did not have a record of the reasons why it adopted the
exclusion and does not have reasoning to show that convictions for all
offenses are unacceptable for the jobs needed.121 The EEOC
stipulates that, based on those facts, joined with a disparate impact
claim on a Title VII-protected basis, “the EEOC would find
reasonable cause to believe the blanket exclusion was not job related
and consistent with business necessity.”122 However, these findings
do not necessarily translate to satisfying burdens of proof for a
disparate impact claim.
There are no cases in the Second Circuit that deal directly with
disparate impact or treatment claims, licensure applications, and
criminal records. However, the Second Circuit recently heard
Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc. that dealt with job exclusions for people
with criminal records.123 The Second Circuit considered an argument
from Black men at a technology services provider, where their offers
of employment were revoked because of past criminal convictions.124
Plaintiffs filed a Title VII disparate impact class action against the
technology services provider. The district court dismissed their
complaint for failure to state a claim because plaintiffs could not
provide statistics specific enough to their situation to represent the
applicant pool in question.125 The plaintiffs provided national
statistics showing that Black people are arrested and incarcerated at
higher rates than white people, relative to their share of the
population — which is similar to the EEOC Guidance.126 The
majority held that national statistics do not represent the competitive
candidate pool from which the employer selected, as the job required
substantial education and technical credentials, which the national
population does not reflect.127

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally 975 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 205.
See id.
See generally EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
Mandala, 975 F.3d at 211–12.
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In his dissent, Judge Chin stated that the national statistics
provided by plaintiffs were not sufficient to meet the burden of a
motion to dismiss, and the majority opinion held the plaintiffs to a
standard more akin to summary judgment.128 The plaintiff’s burden
was to suggest an inference of disparate impact based on race, so that
one could make an inference from the facts that an employer’s
practice disproportionately impacts a protected class.129 Judge Chin
stated that the reliance on national statistics was proper for the initial
pleadings stage of litigation and the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT)’s policy
had a disparate impact on Black job applicants in violation of Title
VII.130 Additionally, Judge Chin added that national statistics could
be applicable in certain disparate impact cases, and this employer
could conceivably qualify.131
NTT is a “global” information
technology services company, the plaintiffs were spread across the
country, and there was no discussion about necessary education or
training in the job description.132 If NTT had a policy resulting in a
disparate impact on Black people, it would be a national disparate
impact.133 After the decision, Judge Chin polled to rehear Mandala
en banc, but the other circuit judges overruled him.134
In a separate case about intentional housing discrimination based
on race, Judge Chin commented on his actions, noting that he had
only polled to rehear a case once in ten years, but he felt that it was
necessary in Mandala because the current holding held the plaintiffs
to a higher “pleading standard in Title VII cases in disregard of
controlling case law.”135 A notable aspect of this case is that the
majority opinion did not mention the EEOC Guidance prohibiting
blanket bans for people with criminal records. NTT had a blanket
ban for people convicted of felonies, and yet there was no discussion
of either the Guidance from the EEOC or the potential
discriminatory nature of the ban itself.136

128. Id. at 214–15.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 215–16.
132. Id. at 216.
133. See id. at 216–17.
134. See generally Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 988 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 2021).
135. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 83 (2d Cir. 2021). Judge Chin
further noted, “In both [Mandala, an employment case, and Francis, a housing case],
instead of drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the Court draws
inferences against them.” Id. at 84 (Chin, J., dissenting in part).
136. See generally Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2020).
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2. Analysis: Various Limitations to Title VII Claims
If people with criminal records brought a Title VII claim against
occupational licensing agencies, they would face several obstacles.
First, unlawful employment practices encompassed in Title VII
applies to employers, employment agencies, or labor organizations.137
Courts would interpret the doctrine literally, therefore foreclosing an
opportunity to sue licensing boards.
Second, employees, not independent contractors, can sue under
Title VII, which widely limits the swath of people who can state a
claim.138 A recent decision in New York’s Appellate Division
classified Uber drivers as employees for unemployment insurance
purposes, which is promising for drivers in New York City and may
push legislators to consider a wider policy change but does not yet
apply to conditions other than unemployment.139 Currently, Uber
and Lyft drivers in New York City are still independent contractors
and would be unable to recover under Title VII.
Third, despite the EEOC’s link between criminal records and Title
VII protected classes based on race in their Guidance document,
plaintiffs in Mandala were unable to state a claim because of their
high burden of proof. Plaintiffs based their initial arguments on
statistics and data promulgated by the EEOC, Department of Justice,
and Department of Labor, which showed a general link between
criminal records and race.140 This was what was available to the
plaintiffs at the time, as the employer’s hiring records which detailed
applicants and criminal records would only be uncovered in
discovery. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate the composition of the applicant pool in question.141
The Second Circuit effectively raised the pleading standard to a
summary judgment standard, which has broad implications for future
Title VII disparate impact claims. The types of data that the court
expected plaintiffs to secure effectively bars people with criminal
records to make these types of claims in the future, as there is no
government-published information about people with criminal
records in the workforce. Further, studies that estimate the number
of people with criminal records in the workforce are speculative and
137. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
138. Id.; see, e.g., Levitin v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1123–24 (N.D.
Ill. 2014) (holding an employee can bring a Title VII claim and finding plaintiff was
an independent contractor who could not bring such a claim).
139. See In re Lowry, 138 N.Y.S.3d 238, 239–41 (App. Div. 2020).
140. See generally Mandala, 975 F.3d.
141. See id. at 211.

2021] OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AS A BARRIER 211
not applicable to any specific area and any given industry. The
employers, in these situations, are in the best position to provide this
data during discovery. For these reasons, it is unlikely that a Title VII
action would prevail.
B. Relevant New York Policy for Licensure Denials

New York City has a number of policies in place that limit the most
harmful effects of discrimination against people with criminal records.
With respect to licensure, it is illegal to have a blanket ban against
people who have criminal records, and there are relevancy limitations
where agencies cannot consider arrests that did not lead to
convictions.142 However, despite the passage of the Fair Chance Act,
there are still gaps in the law for discrimination protections for people
with criminal records who apply for licenses.

i. New York City Human Rights Law and Article 23-A
NYCHRL prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations. The law is loosely based on the parameters
of Title VII but has a much more expansive scope of protected classes
and provides further protections for employment issues.143 For
licensure purposes, NYCHRL explicitly defines “licensing agency”
but does not explicitly include licensure in the employment context.
However, as it is mentioned in the law, it may provide a broader
context, and a more direct link, for bringing a claim based on a
protected class against licensing agencies.
In general, licensure applicants have two choices if they want to
make a discrimination claim about criminal records related to
licensure.144 The first would be similar to a Title VII disparate impact
claim but would use the more expansive NYCHRL instead of Title

142. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16) (McKinney 2021).
143. For example, protected classes under NYCHRL include age, immigration or
citizenship status, color, disability, gender, gender identity, marital and partnership
status, national origin, pregnancy, race, religion/creed, sexual orientation and status
as a veteran or active military service member. See Human Rights, N.Y.C. HUM.
RTS., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/the-law.page [https://perma.cc/4974-5XTJ]
(last visited Sept. 10, 2021). For additional protections in employment, the NYCHRL
has additional protected classes, including arrest or conviction record, caregiver
status, credit history, pre-employment marijuana testing, unemployment status,
sexual and reproductive health decisions, salary history, and status as a victim of
domestic violence, stalking, and sex offenses. See id.
144. In general, if a person wanted to make a direct appeal of their licensure
denial, they would submit an appeal to the NYC Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings (OATH). See N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules, tit. 35, § 68-11.
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VII. This would address some of the concerns from the issues related
to Title VII claims, specifically that licensing agencies are explicitly
addressed in the statute, independent contractors are widely
protected under NYCHRL, and that the traditional McDonnell
Douglass Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework for analyzing
claims at the summary judgment phase does not apply to NYCHRL
claims.145 Addressing those barriers indicates that the NYCHRL
would be more helpful when bringing a claim for occupational
licensure.
The second, but much less likely, claim could be through the FCA,
which amended the NYCHRL in 2015.146 The FCA is a “ban-thebox” law, where employers, labor organizations, and employment
agencies cannot “inquire about or consider the criminal history of job
applicants prior to extending a conditional offers of employment.”147
However, the FCA does not explicitly apply to licensing agencies, as
they do not extend offers of employment and only provide the
certificate so that a worker could secure a job in a given field.148
Despite this, under New York State’s Article 23-A, a licensing agency
cannot deny a license without either: (i) drawing a direct relationship
between the applicant’s conviction history and the prospective job; or
(ii) showing that employing the applicant would involve an
unreasonable risk to property or the safety or welfare of the public.149
An example of a more successful FCA claim, when compared to a
Title VII claim, is Millien v. Madison Square Garden Co.150 In
Millien, plaintiffs filed a disparate impact suit using the NYCHRL

145. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16) (McKinney 2021); see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,
936 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that motions for summary judgment are
limited, so long as plaintiffs can provide some justification that the nondiscriminatory
reasons the employer provided are pretext, the motion for summary judgment will be
denied); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., PROTECTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS & FREELANCERS FROM DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT (2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/materials/Independent_Contractor_
One_Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2TK-BA4G].
146. See Local Law No. 63, 2015 N.Y.C. Laws (2015) (to be codified as N.Y.C.,
N.Y.
ADMIN.
CODE
tit.
8,
§
8-102),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/buildings/local_laws/ll63of2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7SS-AGVZ]; see also N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 2-04 (2021);
N.Y.C., N.Y., Fair Chance Act, ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102, 8-107 (effective Oct. 27,
2015).
147. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 31, at 5.
148. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(9)(a)(3)–(11)(b).
149. Id.
150. No. 17-cv-4000 (AJN), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141633 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2020).
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and the FCA.151 The plaintiffs applied for jobs at Madison Square
Garden and did not disclose criminal convictions on their application,
but they were later revealed through a background check.152 The
plaintiffs made several arguments: (i) that the employer did not
provide the background check to the applicants after criminal
convictions were revealed, which is required by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act; (ii) defendants violated the New York City Human
Rights Law by failing to conduct an Article 23-A analysis, and
(iii) defendant’s practice of refusing to hire employees based on a
failure to disclose their criminal record is discrimination against Black
and Latinx applicants based on a disparate impact theory.153 The
class was certified, and the case settled for $1,300,000.154 This
provided relief for the plaintiffs, as they were able to avoid the hassle
and expense of litigation and still settle for a significant amount.
However, it does not produce case law that could further other
similarly situated plaintiffs’ goals down the road, as the court did not
decide on the three issues.

ii. Analysis: Article 23-A Makes it Easier for Plaintiffs but Does Not
Wholly Address Discriminatory Issues
Shifting the focus to discrete measures that employers do or do not
satisfy by explaining the link between the direct relationship between
criminal conviction and employment provides a clear standard to
abide by. As Article 23-A does not have not a burden-shifting aspect
like Title VII claims, the onus instead is on the employer or licensing
agency to make that direct connection between the job duties and the
conviction history, or demonstrate the unreasonable risk to property,
safety, or welfare of individuals or the public. As one can see with the
difference between Mandala v. DTT and Millien v. Madison Square
Garden, plaintiffs have tools to secure a positive outcome when the
employer has more requirements to prove that they are not
discriminating because of a person’s criminal record.
However, as long as employers and licensing agencies provide the
analysis showing a direct relationship between criminal history and
the job at hand as required by the FCA, they satisfy their statutory

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *9; see also Kevin Stawicki, MSG to Pay $1.3M to End Criminal
Background
Check
Suit,
Law360
(June
25,
2019,
8:56
PM),
151.
152.
153.
154.

https://www.law360.com/articles/1172639 [https://perma.cc/9NPX-B2YA].
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burden.155 In practice, an Article 23-A analysis is not arduous. The
plaintiffs in Millien were likely to prevail on their claim because the
defendants wholly omitted performing that balance. However, if the
company completed the balance but was arguably overbroad in its
construction of what relates to business interest, it is not as clear that
the plaintiffs would prevail, as courts are generally deferential to
business and business interests.
C. Due Process, Summary Suspensions, and FCA Amendments

The New York City Council amended New York City’s FCA, and
amendments took effect in July 2021 to include protections for
applicants and employees with pending arrests.156
With the
amendments, it is now unlawful for an employer to take adverse
action against an applicant or employee based on a pending criminal
accusation or arrest unless they can determine that there is a direct
relationship between the accusation and the position, or reasonably
assert that continued employment would involve an unreasonable risk
to property or the safety or welfare of the public.157 Because this
amendment is so recent, it is unclear how it will be litigated and
interpreted, but it more generally provides promise for people with
open criminal cases. However, these amendments do not impact
occupational licensing agencies and summary suspensions.
The Nnebe plaintiffs, taxi drivers in New York City, have
participated in ongoing litigation related to summary suspensions for
15 years.158 Through the years of litigation, the courts have grappled
with drivers’ due process rights when their license — and their ability
to make a livelihood — is suspended based on a pending charge.159 In
a 2019 appeal, the Court determined that plaintiffs had a significant
property interest that was implicated, and engaged in a balancing test
of factors from Mathews v. Eldridge,160 which included private
interests, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and

155. N.Y.C., N.Y., Fair Chance Act, ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102, 8-107 (effective Oct.
27, 2015).
156. See Local Law No. 4, 2021 N.Y.C. Laws (2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
cchr/downloads/pdf/amendments/Local-Law-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6CY-K6DV];
see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(10)(b)–(c).
157. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(10)(b)–(c).
158. See, e.g., Nnebe v. Daus, 510 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Nnebe v. Daus,
No. 06-CV-4991 (KMK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58611 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2006).
159. See Nnebe v. Daus, 931 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2019).
160. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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the government’s interest.161 As the TLC operated at that time, it
only focused on whether the charge, if true, would pose a direct and
substantial threat, and did not perform an individualized
determination based on the circumstances of the arrest.162 This did
not satisfy a drivers’ due process right, and it violated the New York
City ordinance that the TLC relies upon to operate.163 The court
found that individual circumstances are relevant to the statutory
scheme, particularly when a driver is threatened with the loss of their
income and livelihood.164 Since 2019, the TLC has revised its
summary suspension policies, but only insofar as to acknowledge and
assess the conditions of one’s arrest.165 These procedures have
increased the ability for drivers to secure their property and
livelihoods, as in the past year, ALJs “recommended reinstatement of
the driver’s license in 14 out of the 19 hearings,” which is far greater
than when ALJs assessed the merits solely based on the face of the
charge.166
III. PROPOSALS: ENVISIONING POTENTIAL POLICIES TO
DECREASE EXCLUSION FOR THOSE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS

Ultimately, these proposals hope to reconcile some of the more
discriminatory impacts of laws around occupational licensure so that
we can strive for a more equal society. Without stronger mechanisms
to address discrimination in society today, the full inclusion of Black
and Latinx people with criminal records into the labor market and the
societal pursuit of racial equity will be impaired. To address these
issues, the Author proposes amendments to the FCA. These
amendments could help address the racial harms that present antidiscrimination law doctrine does not currently address.
To remedy the lack of channels in federal anti-discrimination
law,167 there are a number of policy considerations that states,
municipalities, and agencies that control occupational licensure could
implement. The FCA has been a useful tool to further strengthen the
rights of people with criminal records when applying for jobs, and
these proposals could be folded into an updated FCA, which includes
protections for people applying for or with occupational licenses,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Nnebe, 931 F.3d at 80 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Id. at 82.
See id.; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-512.1(a).
Nnebe, 931 F.3d at 83.
See Nnebe v. Daus, 510 F. Supp. 3d 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id.
The lack of channels are outlined in supra Part II.A.i.2.
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which other municipalities and states could adopt. The proposals fall
into two general categories: directly decreasing the exclusion of
people with criminal records and increasing transparency so that the
process of securing a license is less opaque. Additionally, the
proposals would make it easier for plaintiffs bringing a disparate
impact claim based on race and criminal records, as in Mandala,168 to
garner data to satisfy the heightened pleading standard.
A. Limitations of Information Requested in a Background Check

Agencies could limit the types of record information requested in a
background check, so that the information produced would be
narrowly tailored in relation to the license applied. This could be
organized in several ways.
A first could be by time: people who have been convicted are no
more likely to commit another crime after nine years of nonrecidivism when compared to the general population.169 Based on
this, licensing agencies can limit the scope of time to nine years prior,
as those employees would be similar in “risk” to other members of
the population. This would include people with felony convictions,
which are the types of offenses that are most restricted in New York
City’s licensure scheme today. This change would likely have the
most impact on New Yorkers with criminal records trying to secure
licensure today.
The second proposal for a narrow tailoring is through the types of
convictions on a person’s record to the convictions that the employer
already identified are relevant to their business. This would create
clear expectations for applicants. For example, the Taxi and
Limousine Commission could provide a list of crimes that would
identify those that relate to operating a taxicab in their application
materials, and only people with those stated convictions would be
denied licensure. Any such list would need to be approved by an

168. See generally Part II.
169. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 250975, SPECIAL
REPORT: 2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD
(2005–2014) 6 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B968-NB8J]. After nine years post-release with no subsequent
arrests, only 1% of those released were arrested in the ninth year. Id. For context, at
least 4.9 million people are arrested and booked in jail each year, which is less than
1% of the general population in the United States. See Alexi Jones & Wendy
Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are Misused to Respond to
Social
Problems,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Aug.
26,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html
[https://perma.cc/7WD2WSAK].
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external entity to preclude a significant risk: that employers might use
this opportunity to widely exclude certain offenses so that they are
protected if they want to later exclude an applicant. Certifying a list
by an entity, which could be comprised of labor leaders and current
drivers, would ensure increased transparency to applicants so that
they know their chances of success before investing in training or
education for a license.
Third, agencies could make explicit what information would be
disclosed upon application. As it currently stands, dismissed charges
or adjournments in contemplation of dismissal (ACDs) are not taken
into consideration, but language on applications tends to not
explicitly state what is included and is not. To be more transparent
and help people decide whether they want to apply or not, the
jurisdiction could mandate disclaimers at the beginning of each
license application that states that only convictions are considered,
and other instances, like ACDs and dismissed charges, are not seen in
an applicant’s application.
B. Predetermination of Admission or Disqualification

Another recommendation that increases transparency for
applicants is to create an arm within the licensing agency to provide
guidance on pursuing a license and whether the person would
successfully achieve licensure based on their record. Arizona enacted
similar legislation, where applicants can receive a predetermination
on whether they would be disqualified.170 This provides transparency
to the process and allows applicants to avoid the expensive process of
education and training for licensure with the risk that they could be
denied. This would have to be done delicately, and the workers at the
agency would need to be specifically trained to have sensitivity
around criminal convictions, as Ms. Stephenson’s example shows
what can happen if people from the licensing board are not specific
and accurate with the information they provide to the public.171
Despite the potential for instances like the one Ms. Stephenson faced,
having a dedicated body that would be able to provide
recommendations would help potential applicants parse their chances
at application and might lessen hesitancy from communities who
would otherwise not apply.

170. See UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 32, at 6.
171. See supra Part I.B.iii.
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C. Increased Data Collection

Increased transparency with data on people with convictions would
make federal and state disparate impact claims easier for plaintiffs.
One option to address pleading issues on disparate impact is to
mandate data collection through an existing government agency, such
as parole boards, which already have contact with people reentering
society, and publication for reentry so that there can be more
information on how to adequately and accurately address issues that
people reentering society are facing. However, there are privacy
concerns with government tracking and collecting more data and
information on people who have been incarcerated or who have
criminal records. There are ways to collect this data in a less intrusive
way, such as anonymizing the data collection and reports. This would
also help not only with potential licensure claims but also job
application claims. If the plaintiffs in Mandala had access to such
data, their claim might have ultimately prevailed.
Another, easier, option is to mandate data collection from licensing
boards to provide comprehensive summaries each quarter regarding
applications and license grants. This information could include how
many people applied for licensure, how many secured licenses, how
many of those had criminal records, how many of those were felonies
or misdemeanors, and the same for those denied. This would provide
a more transparent process and could aid in the approval of more
licenses for people with criminal records.
Additionally, there should be more studies on people who might
pursue occupational licensure but are deterred by the levels of
information they need to disclose about their record upon
application. There is a dearth of data on this topic, and to make more
informed policy, it would be useful to have more relevant information
on why they are deterred so that agencies and advocacy groups can
seek to remedy those issues.
D. Expansion of the Current FCA Amendments to
Cover Summary Suspensions

The recent FCA Amendments, while still new, provide reassurance
for people who become involved with the criminal legal system during
their tenure at their jobs or upon applying to a new one. These same
amendments should be expanded to encompass occupational
licensure as well, where the FCA explicitly covers employers and
occupational licensing agencies — both for the recent amendments
and for more general protections surrounding people with criminal
records.
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CONCLUSION

Current anti-discrimination law does not meaningfully address the
discrimination that Black and Latinx people with criminal records
face in gaining employment. The legal regulation of people with
criminal histories’ lives has a disproportionate effect on Black and
Latinx people, particularly as it relates to employment opportunities
and occupational licensing. Without legal protections and remedies
to combat those disproportionate effects, the full inclusion of Black
and Latinx people into the labor market, particularly for higherpaying jobs, and the societal pursuit of racial equality will be
impaired. As it currently stands, federal, state, and city antidiscrimination laws lack the depth to address these issues. State and
city-level adoptions of an amended FCA, where barriers to
occupational licensing are explicitly addressed, are common-sense
proposals that would begin to address the unnecessary and day-to-day
hardships that those with records face.

